The Rudolf Steiner Archive

The German people can only create space for a healthy reconstruction of the social order by unreservedly uncovering the truth about the causes of the outbreak of war, insofar as they can be found by them, and about the effectiveness of the powers that were really decisive in Germany during the war. Regardless of what the rest of the world does, the German people are finally doing their duty: they are finally telling the full truth, which has not yet been told. Today, it owes itself and its honor unsparing truthfulness before the public.

The undersigned committee of the Bund für Dreigliederung des sozialen Organismus, which - following the appeal "An das deutsche Volk und an die Kulturwelt" written by Dr. Rudolf Steiner - has set itself the goal of liberating the forces that can lead to a reconstruction of the social body, declares in order to create space for these forces:

1. we demand a truthful account of the events that led to the war, in particular everything that took place in Berlin in the last days before its outbreak, regardless of whether this is approved from a low utilitarian point of view or not, and regardless of whether leading personalities are compromised as a result. We call on official bodies and private individuals who can contribute to overcoming the cover-up of the causes of the war created by the leading circles during the war and not removed after the capitulation to come forward with their knowledge without reserve. If anyone needs assistance in revealing the truth, we are ready to be of service to them. We are not concerned with punishing the guilty, but with ruthlessly exposing the truth.

2. as far as we ourselves are able, we help the truth to break through. The publication initiated by Dr. Rudolf Steiner in these 'days in agreement with the wife of Colonel General v. Moltke of the records of this man, who was at the center of the decisive events, on the course of the actions and omissions of the leading circles in Berlin that led directly to the war, we make our own affair.¹

3 We call on the relevant government circles to allow the facts brought to light in these records to be made the basis of a discussion of the truth before the widest public, covering all related facts.

Bund für Dreigliederung des sozialen Organismus Working Committee.

Whoever shares the view expressed in the above appeal and wishes to uncover the full truth about the important events before the beginning of the war is requested to send in this sheet with their signature and address.

Bund für Dreigliederung des sozialen Organismus
Stuttgart office
Champignystrasse 17

• 1. Die "Schuld" am Kriege. Published by Greiner & Pfeiffer, Stuttgart. Published by the Bund für Dreigliederung, Stuttgart. Price M. 1.20.

An interview by "Matin" reporter Jules Sauerwein with Dr. Rudolf Steiner about the unpublished memoirs of the late German Chief of Staff von Moltke October 1921

[ 1 ] "You know that, if your opponents are to be believed, the Chief of the General Staff is said to have lost first his head and then the Battle of Marne through you."

[ 2 ] This is the question I put to the famous spiritual researcher and sociologist Rudolf Steiner, born a German-Austrian. I have had sincere admiration and friendly feelings for him for more than fifteen years. It gave me great satisfaction at the time to translate several of his theosophical works into French. Whenever my travels permit, I never fail to pay a brief visit to Dr. Steiner in Dornach when passing through Basel.

[ 3 ] This time, too, I met him at the strange and imposing building that was given the name Goetheanum by his students in honor of Goethe as a forerunner of spiritual science. I have already written in the "Matin" about the man as well as the building and its wonderful location on the last foothills of the Jura, crowned by castle ruins.

[ 4 ] Rudolf Steiner had just returned from Germany after giving lectures on his teachings to thousands of enthusiastic listeners in Stuttgart and Berlin. In Dornach on the same day he received a group of 120 theologians with whom he had entered into a discussion of theological and religious questions. Quite a number of these theologians intended to tackle a reorganization of religious life on the basis of the teachings advocated by Dr. Steiner.

[ 5 ] Dr. Steiner was working on a huge group of wooden sculptures depicting Christ and the underlying seductive powers, Lucifer and Ahriman. It is one of the most impressive creations I have ever seen; it will form the central end of the smaller domed room in the Goetheanum. As I watched the listeners coming up the hill in small groups at dusk to gather for the lecture, Dr. Steiner told me about the attacks of his opponents. Clerics and all-Germans and fanatical followers of various religious denominations are fighting against him with every weapon and at every opportunity.

The fear of the truth

[ 6 ] When I asked him the question about General von Moltke straight away, he turned his penetrating eyes on me, which looked at me from a face furrowed by forty years of intense spiritual struggle.

[ 7 ] "What you tell me does not astonish me. No means will be spared to drive me out of Germany and possibly also out of Switzerland. These attacks are based on a wide variety of grounds. But insofar as they extend to my relations with Moltke, they have a very specific aim. They want to prevent the publication of some notes that Moltke made for his family before his death and whose publication in the book trade I was supposed to arrange in agreement with Mrs. von Moltke.

[ 8 ] These memoirs should have been published in 1919. Immediately before its publication, a person in charge of Prussia's diplomatic representation in Stuttgart came to see me to tell me that this publication was impossible and that they would not want it in Berlin. Later, a general who had been in positions around General von Moltke and Wilhelm II came to me and gave me the same ideas. I protested against this and wanted to disregard it. I thought of turning to Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, who was present in Versailles at the time, but could achieve nothing. My efforts were all the more unsuccessful as at the same time Mrs. von Moltke was approached with ideas that she could not resist.

[ 9 ] Why these fears? These memoirs are by no means an indictment of the imperial government. But it is clear from them, what is perhaps worse, that the imperial government was in a state of complete confusion and under incomprehensibly reckless and ignorant leadership. One can apply to the responsible personalities the sentence I wrote down in my preface: 'It was not what they did that contributed to bringing about the disaster, but the whole nature of their personalities.

[ 10 ] I might add that it was the peculiar circumstances which caused the weight of the decisive decisions to rest finally on a single man, the Chief of the General Staff, who saw himself compelled to do his military duty because politics had come to a standstill. I never spoke to him about political or military issues before Moltke's resignation. It was only later, when he was seriously ill, that he naturally spoke openly to me about all these matters, and since this will interest you, I will tell you what he told me himself and what is also evident from his unpublished memoirs.

[ 11 ] At the end of June 1914, Moltke, who had been Chief of the General Staff since 1905, went to Carlsbad for health reasons. Until his death, he knew nothing of a Potsdam consultation on July 5 or 6. He had only returned to Berlin in good health after the ultimatum to Serbia. Since his return he had, as he said, been firmly convinced that Russia would attack. He clearly foresaw the tragic development that things were bound to take, that is, he believed in the participation of France and England in the world conflict. He wrote a memorandum for the Kaiser pointing out the necessity of measures to be taken. The plan of the German General Staff had essentially been laid down for a long time. It had been drawn up by Moltke's predecessor, von Schlieffen. You know its main features: Large masses were to be thrown against France in order to achieve a quick decision in the west at any cost. A weak defensive army was planned against Russia, which was to be replenished later after the decision on the western theater of war.

Disturbed people

[ 12 ] Von Moltke had changed his predecessor's plan on one important point, however. While Schlieffen had envisaged a simultaneous march through Belgium and Holland, Moltke had renounced Holland in order to give Germany breathing space in the event of a blockade.

[ 13 ] When Moltke arrived at the castle on Friday, July 31, he found people completely confused. He had the impression, as he said, that he found himself in the position of having to make a decision all by himself. The Kaiser had not yet signed the mobilization order that day, an order which in Germany was tantamount to a declaration of war, for as soon as this order was given, everything, including the first operation, was carried out at specific times with a relentless automatism. Wilhelm II contented himself for that day with proclaiming the imminent threat of war. The following day, on Saturday, August 1, at four o'clock in the afternoon, he summoned Moltke again, and in the six hours that followed, the following drama unfolded.

[ 14 ] Moltke met the Emperor in the presence of Bethmann Hollweg, whose knees were literally trembling, the War Minister Falkenhayn, General von Plessen, Lyncker and several others. The Emperor voiced strong opposition to the intentions of the Chief of Staff. He had, he said, received the best news from England. England would not only remain neutral - as George V informed him - but would even prevent France from taking part in the war. Under these conditions, it would be logical to throw the whole army against Russia. No, replied Moltke, the plan must be carried out in the East as well as in the West as it is laid down, if we do not wish to bring about the greatest misfortune.

The technical reasons

[ 15 ] The objections do not affect Moltke; he refuses to change anything. He asserts that the mobilization order must be complied with without delay. He does not believe in the English telegrams, and with the mobilization order in his hand, which Wilhelm II has just signed, he is dismissed, leaving the others in a state of complete confusion. Thus it came about that the decision on the outbreak of war had to be made for purely military reasons. On the way from the palace to the General Staff, his car was overtaken by an imperial automobile. Moltke is recalled on behalf of the Emperor. The Emperor is more excited than ever. He shows his Chief of Staff a telegram from England. He believes he can see with absolute certainty from this telegram that the conflict is confined to the East and that England and France will remain neutral. 'An order must be sent immediately to the army,' he concludes, 'not to proceed in the west. Moltke's reply was that an army could not be exposed to the alternative of orders and counter-orders. While Moltke was standing there, the Kaiser turned to the wing adjutant on duty and ordered him to immediately transmit an order to the command of the 16th Division in Trier that it was not to march into Luxembourg. Moltke went home. Shaken, because he expects the greatest disaster from such measures, he sits down at his table. He declares that he cannot take any measures for the army in accordance with the Emperor's telephonic order. This order is brought to him by an adjutant for his signature. He refuses to sign and pushes the order back. He remained in a state of dull exhaustion until 11 o'clock in the evening, even though he had returned from Karlsbad in good health. At 11 o'clock he is rung up. The Emperor asks for him again. He immediately goes to the palace. Wilhelm II, who had already retired, throws on a robe and says: "Everything has changed. Disaster is on its way. The King of England has just declared in a new telegram that he has been misunderstood and that he will not accept any obligation on behalf of himself or France. He concludes with the words: "Now you can do what you like. And now the war begins.

Bloomy omens

[ 16 ] In the month of August, I saw General von Moltke only once, on August 27 in Koblenz. Our conversation revolved around purely human matters. The German army was still in full victory mode. There was no reason to talk about what was not yet there. The Battle of Marne unfolded later. I had not seen von Moltke until then. It took place under conditions which must have shaken von Moltke's expectations to the core. During the trial maneuvers he had several times ordered a cautious advance on the right wing, which could have been considered in a march on Paris. Three times Kluck, who had supreme command of the right wing, had advanced too quickly. Each time Moltke said to him, "If you advance just as quickly at the decisive moment, we will lose the war in an emergency. When Kluck's army was threatened with being surrounded, Moltke was seized by a terrible premonition. The thought came to him: the war could be lost for Germany. This seems to me to be part of the 'psychology' of the course of the war. When von Moltke returned to headquarters on September 13, he gave the impression of a deeply shaken man. Those around the Kaiser thought he was ill. From that moment on, Falkenhayn, without having the official title, was in fact in command. Later, when Moltke was confined to bed, Wilhelm II visited him. Is it still me who is in charge of the operations? he asked the Emperor. I do indeed believe that it is still you, replied Wilhelm II. For weeks, the Kaiser did not even know who was the actual commander-in-chief of his troops.

[ 17 ] But now a new example of the opinion people had of Wilhelm II in his own environment. One day, when von Moltke was describing to me the feelings of deep sorrow he was experiencing on his return to Belgium after the capture of Antwerp, I asked him for the first time about the invasion of Belgium. How was it, I asked, that a Minister of War could claim in the Reichstag that the plan to invade Belgium had not existed? This minister, Moltke replied, did not know my plan, but the Chancellor was up to date. And the Kaiser? Never, said Moltke: he was too talkative and indiscreet. He would have blabbed it to the whole world!"

Jules Sauerwein

Note from the editors, Rudolf Steiner, whom we informed of our intention to publish his conversation with Jules Sauerwein here as well, writes the following

Dreigliederung, Vol. 3, No. 15, October 12, 1921 / Das Goetheanum, Vol. 1,. No. 9, October 16, 1921

[ 1 ] It seemed impossible not to answer the questions put to me during a visit by my friend Dr. Jules Sauerwein. For, firstly, I consider the present moment to be one in which everyone who knows anything about the truth of the war must speak. Under the circumstances, I should have considered silence to be a breach of duty. What I have said, I could say quite independently of Mr. von Moltke's memoirs. I heard all this from Mr. von Moltke in November 1914 and later myself - even often - and was never under any obligation to remain silent. It was only natural not to talk about it at an inappropriate time.

[ 2 ] Secondly, there is something else to consider. I knew Mr. von Moltke and for years learned to appreciate the nobility of this personality, whose lips certainly never uttered a subjective untruth. In July 1914 he was placed in a tragic situation. He knew the dreadful thing that had to be decided, and his military duty required him to decide alone. Now I may perhaps remark that on another visit shortly before, Dr. Jules Sauerwein told me that news was now being spread from certain quarters that von Moltke had died in mental derangement. He asked me what was true about these things and their connection with the war. I also felt obliged not to remain silent in the face of these outrageous and untrue scatterings. (I need hardly say that Mrs. von Moltke knew nothing of a conversation with Dr. Sauerwein.)

[ 3 ] I believe that the discussions about the "guilt" of the war are on the wrong track. One cannot speak of "guilt" in the way one does. There is tragedy. And the war was caused by a tragic situation. That shows best how I must believe what I have heard from Mr. von Moltke about the next war. I do not feel compelled to go into the nonsensical talk of von Moltke's "mystical" inclinations. What he did with regard to the war he considered a necessity out of his military duty. And I think that what he said is suitable for putting the discussion about the "guilt" of war on a different footing from that on which it stands in the world today.

Rudolf Steiner

[ 1 ] When I wrote the few "subsequent remarks" in No. 15 of this weekly on Dr. Sauerwein's reproduction of a conversation between him and me, I had not yet read any of the comments that appeared in the press about the "Matin" article. I assumed that every unbiased reader of this article must recognize that there is something in what I have communicated about von Moltke's oral or written statements, the right further discussion of which must lead to the world no longer being able to speak of a "guilt" of Germany, but of a tragic doom. For these statements make it clear:

[ 2 ] 1. that the circumstances at the end of July 1914 in Germany placed the decision on the measures to be taken in the hands of one man, the Chief of the General Staff von Moltke. At the decisive moment, he was allowed to do nothing other than his military duty. This eliminates all talk of German warmongers. For it is precisely von Moltke's account that proves that even if such warmongers had been present, they would have had no influence on von Moltke's decision. Moltke's account is not that of a party, but that of a man who acted with a highly developed sense of responsibility. His word comes before all others. It is not spoken to the detriment of Germany.

[ 3 ] 2 It is clear from the reproduction of von Moltke's statements that he knew nothing of a Potsdam consultation (an alleged Crown Council) on July 5 or 6 until his death. This disproves all the fairy tales that have linked decisive events to such a council. How anyone can say that I continue to perpetuate this fairy tale is beyond me.

[ 4 ] 3. I have often heard from von Moltke that the war plan essentially originated with von Schlieffen. It seems important that von Moltke emphasized that he had abandoned von Schlieffen's intention of marching through southern Holland with the right wing, preferring to take on the great technical difficulties caused by the fact that the right wing of the German army had to force its way through the narrow space between Aachen and the southern border of the province of Limburg. From this it is clear to any unbiased person that the German army command was most earnestly endeavoring not to do a single bit more towards the west of what was then regarded as such a grave injustice than it had to do according to the responsibility it bore. Anything else would have been a matter for the political leadership. The fact that von Schlieffen considered more to be necessary can serve as proof of this fact. From the fact that more than a decade before the outbreak of war there was the intention to march through Holland, nothing can really be concluded about the events of 1914. To want to incriminate Germany with this is simply ridiculous.

[ 5 ] 4. Anyone who knew von Moltke should know that no untruth could come from his lips in any of these matters. But it is important for the world to know how he found himself in his surroundings in that hour which he regarded like no other as Germany's hour of destiny. To conceal what was going on between him and those around him is to withhold from the world the most important thing that can be known about the outbreak of war. Others may think differently, perhaps to spare this or that person. But they should not impute dishonest intentions to those who cannot agree with them.

[ 6 ] Now, of the press statements that have been linked to Dr. Sauerwein's article, those in the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" are probably the ones that can be taken most seriously.

[ 7 ] In response to Major General von Haeften's remark that my reports are intended to make it clear that "all those men in whose hands the fate of Germany lay at that time were more or less weaklings", I will only say this: After all, one need only read the many memoirs that have been written since the end of the war to see what "those men" threw at each other; and one will then hardly say, with an unbiased judgment, "Such a tendency cannot be opposed explicitly enough. " I have reproduced Moltke's judgment. If you want proof of this, read von Tirpitz's memoirs. What I cannot accept, however, is von Haeften's sentence: ... . for weakness and recklessness in such a situation are perhaps more burdensome and a greater guilt than a conscious will to war." Can one speak like this if one lives in the real world and not in a ghost world? What Germany is accused of is a "conscious will to war". It is seen as its fault. If one can no longer speak of a conscious will to war, but only of "légèreté" and "ignorance inconcevables" (incomprehensible recklessness and ignorance), then it is possible to work towards revising the views on "guilt". Incidentally, it is significant that von Haeften does not speak of what I actually said, but of "weakness and recklessness". I have often heard and read these words in Germany, but I have not used them. The fact that recklessness and ignorance, i.e. qualities for which those who have them are ultimately not responsible, can justify "greater guilt" than a "conscious will to war", will firstly be difficult to convey to a legal mind, and secondly, if viewed correctly, "in such a situation" as that of July 1914, it may well lead to tragic doom, but not to a conviction for "conscious" guilt.

[ 8 ] What Mr. von Haeften further claims about von Moltke's relationship with me, he could know better. He says: "As long as he was in full possession of his health, Colonel General von Moltke was completely opposed to Mr. Steiner and his endeavours, even though Mrs. von Moltke, who was under the spell of Steiner's ideas, had often tried to influence her husband in Steiner's direction. Only the mentally and physically ill colonel general showed himself open to Steiner's ideas during his visit to Homburg Castle in November 1914, and after his resignation from his position as chief of the general staff of the army, he placed his trust in Mr. Steiner, a trust that the latter does not repay him well today." These assertions about my relationship with Mr. von Moltke are all objective falsehoods. Rather, the following is true. I have frequented Mr. von Moltke's house since 1904. I was invited to every single visit. The invitation came not only from Mrs. von Moltke, but also from Mr. von Moltke. I have the greatest admiration for Mr. von Moltke. But I never imposed myself on him. The conversations, which often lasted many hours, always covered questions of worldview. Mr. von Moltke was enlightened enough to see that my world view was far removed from all nebulous mysticism and wanted to rest on a secure foundation of knowledge. He would not have been easy to "influence", even if I had tried. But he saw that I was not at all interested in "influencing" him. He told me not once, but very often: "Your world view satisfies the mind, because it is the case with it, which I have never encountered with any other, all things support each other and fit together without contradiction." Because his thinking was quite healthy, he also had healthy skepticism and did not get over many things easily. He had doubts time and again. But even in the face of these doubts, he always made use of the above-mentioned sentence. He also said to me: "When people with the usual education of today find out about your views, you will have wonderful things to experience."

[ 9 ] This relationship has existed between Mr. von Moltke and me since 1904; and my visit to Homburg, which was also by invitation, has not changed it in the slightest. From my visit to Homburg until his death, he believed me no less and no more than he had done ten years earlier. - Whether, in his opinion, which is the only thing that really matters to me in this matter, I thank him less for his trust than someone who says that von Moltke only talked to me because he was mentally and physically ill, and yet he also enjoyed his trust, I don't want to argue about that at all. It just strikes me that someone who was "in the official environment" of Colonel General von Moltke at the outbreak of the war and during his stay in Homburg speaks of his "resignation from his position as Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army" without fear of using a dubious phrase with this formulation.

[ 10 ] I have already said above that Sauerwein's article disproves the fairy tale of the Crown Council on July 5. If it is said that I have concealed the fact that Colonel General von Moltke could not have known anything about the Crown Council because it never took place, then this seems to me to be a quibble, for if Mr. von Moltke knew nothing about such a thing, then nothing of any significance could have taken place.

[ 11 ] The fact that today Holland cannot be drawn into a new French propaganda campaign regarding the question of guilt by reasonable people, because it has been said that Mr. von Moltke wanted to refrain from marching through Holland, seems to me, as I have said above, quite clear. Mr. von Moltke's words prove that long before 1914 such a march through Holland was refrained from, despite the fact that Mr. von Schlieffen, whom Mr. von Moltke also regarded as a great military authority, believed that such a march might be necessary. But it is not entirely irrelevant that this march through, which Mr. von Haeften also admits that von Schlieffen had included in the "circle of his considerations", should only have been carried out on the condition that "Holland would voluntarily join the German side in the event of the outbreak of war". So says Mr. von Haeften. No one will dispute this. And if, as must certainly be admitted from the military point of view, this is a relief for Germany, it may also be asserted that, on further examination of this matter, the mention of von Schlieffen's intentions with regard to Holland should also make the march through Belgium appear in a different light than the one in which it has hitherto been seen alone. For this premise also applies to Belgium within certain limits. Mr. von Moltke reckoned that although Belgium would not side with the Germans, it would be friendly enough not to put up any resistance in arms to the march through. It is therefore not at all certain that Germany would have marched through Belgium in any case if things had not simply been rushed in the decisive days. How to judge these things politically is not for me to discuss here, although I know that the Belgian guarantee of neutrality was a very special one; for I did not speak about it with Dr. Sauerwein, but only about Mr. von Moltke's opinion.

[ 12 ] The shifts in dates mentioned by Mr. von Haeften, which can be found in Sauerwein's article, have been corrected in No. 15 of this weekly publication. What Mr. von Haeften adds in detail to what was said in the "Matin" article does not essentially contradict what was said there; it even supplements it and confirms it in essential points. Mr. von Haeften says: "Mr. Steiner's assertion that Colonel General von Moltke refused to countersign an order from the Kaiser delivered to him by a wing adjutant and sent the officer back is a free invention. Colonel-General von Moltke merely refused to sign a corresponding draft order from the head of the Operations Department (Lieutenant-Colonel Tappen)." There is nothing to correct other than the "wing adjutant", because I did not claim that the "draft order" was written by the Kaiser himself. And I readily admit that an officer knows more about wing adjutants than Sauerwein. Von Moltke's own words about it are: "As the dispatch to the 16th Division was presented to me, repeating the order given by telephone, I struck the pen on the table and declared I would not sign it." Mr. von Haeften emphasizes: "General von Moltke was a soldier unwaveringly loyal to his Emperor, despite some conflicting opinions, especially during the last years of his life." I fully agree with this. One can say even more. Von Moltke was one of the very best servants of his Emperor. And as a man who was always fully aware of his responsibilities, he never held back from giving the Emperor the advice he considered most suitable for him, even if it ran counter to the Emperor's opinions. But that is precisely what makes von Moltke's statements, which are reproduced completely correctly, so valuable. It was not an opponent of the Emperor who made them, but one of his most loyal servants who wrested them out of the matter. Anyone who believes that von Moltke spoke out of resentment or bitterness misjudges the colonel general. Everything that he experienced from the end of July 1914 onwards has cast him down; but he was never in a state that can be described as mentally ill in the sense that those who now believe they have to excuse his statements with the state of his soul do.

[ 13 ] What he said is, in my firm conviction, suitable for placing all previous discussion about the "question of guilt" on a basis on which the present rulers of the victorious states do not want it, but for which more and more reasonable people all over the world will be accessible. I cannot understand why Mr. von Haeften, whom I have come to know as a reasonable man, is not open to such a consideration today. One should realize that the German people will have the most to "pay for" if saying things like those of Moltke's opinion is repeatedly portrayed as an offence. The German people have no need to hold back with the truth. Those who believed they had to do so have done them the most harm so far. The truth will not incriminate the German people, it will exonerate them. We should have realized this in the days leading up to the Versailles peace treaty. We should realize it again today. Those who want to defend the German politicians of 1914 should be reminded of what von Tirpitz wrote in his "Memoirs". For example, on page 242: "The impression of the headlessness of our political leadership became more and more disturbing. The march through Belgium did not seem to have been an established fact beforehand (he means on the night of August 1 to 2). Since the Russian mobilization, the Chancellor gave the impression of a drowning man... . While the lawyers of the Foreign Office were engrossed in the doctoral question of whether we were already at war with Russia or not yet, it turned out in passing that they had forgotten to ask Austria whether it wanted to fight with us against Russia." On page 245, the same von Tirpitz says: "After the Chancellor left the meeting, Moltke complained to the Kaiser about the 'deplorable' state of the political leadership, which had no preparations for the situation and now that the avalanche was rolling, was still thinking of nothing but legal notes." And men about whom someone (von Tirpitz) who has worked with them has to speak in this way should not be criticized by the German people, but "thanked". They should be satisfied with the opinion that they "thought and acted logically and dutifully". On page 248, von Tirpitz says: "The moral blamelessness of our government at that time can only be made clear by an open presentation of its diplomatic inadequacy.....

[ 14 ] Von Moltke's views and statements are certainly in the direction in which these matters must be clarified. If they are discussed correctly, they cannot fail to have an effect. However, if they are discussed in the way they have been so far, this will of course result in something that the German "people will have to pay for", as unfortunately they already have to "pay for" enough.

[ 15 ] Whether one has a right to speak of "political dilettantes" in the way Mr. von Haeften does, with the background provided by von Tirpitz's words on page 248, among others, must be seriously questioned. It says that the politicians of 1914 "were lacking" ... "through lack of straight and clear thinking."

[ 16 ] I would prefer to remain silent for the time being about personal slurs such as those contained in sentences about my "addiction to playing a political role". I would not have expected this judgment from Mr. von Haeften, whom I once got to know as a noble-minded man. It seems as if you can't just have prejudices from the outset, but as if, even if you didn't have them once, you can still acquire them afterwards.

[ 17 ] What I have said I believed I could not conceal, because unfortunately I see that personalities who can certainly have the subjective opinion that they do not want to do the "business of their enemies" do so precisely because they do not want to give the truth free rein. In my opinion, I have to recognize again today how some people are sinning in this direction.

[ 1 ] I feel obliged to respond to the thoroughly objective objections raised by Major Muff ("Stuttgarter Neues Tagblatt", November 1, 1921) against the intention and content of the "Matin" interview. For the time being, however, I would like to express my satisfaction with this objectivity; for when one continually hears only personal slurs from so many sides, one is glad to have to deal with a noble tone in polemics for once.

[ 2 ] First of all, Major Muff says that I added to Dr. Sauerwein's interview in subsequent remarks: "One cannot speak of guilt in the way one does. There is tragedy. And the war was caused by a tragic situation." If you read a few more sentences in my "supplementary remarks", you will come across the following words: "And I think that what he (Moltke) said is suitable for putting the discussion about the 'guilt' of the war on a different basis than the one on which it stands in the world today." Major Muff says: "As Germans, we have every reason to oppose such a shift in the level of discussion." To be honest, that seems a little unworldly to me. The whole context of my words implies that the discussion "in the world", that is, under today's conditions, should essentially be placed on a different footing from the one on which it stands among Germany's opponents. On what basis does it stand? On no other basis than that Germany deliberately brought about the war. The fact that Lloyd George sometimes speaks this way, sometimes a little differently, cannot really lead to the belief that "the truth about the guilt of the war" ... "is already on the march". If one looks at the discussion about war guilt today without being unworldly, then one could be satisfied if the discussion were based on the following by reasonable people outside Germany: there is no "guilt" on the German side, as has been thought up to now, but at the starting point there is a tragic situation in Germany. I believe that it is really not in Germany's interest to reject such a shift in the basis for discussion. Especially not if one admits the essence of this tragic situation, as Major Muff does. He speaks of the "political harmlessness, to put it mildly" of the leading German politicians in the face of Moltke's judgment at the outbreak of the war. Now, in view of the magnitude of the matter, it is perhaps not entirely necessary to express oneself "mildly". If this is not the case, Major Muff's sentence will also have to be seen as proof that the German politicians failed completely in 1914. But therein lies the tragic situation.

[ 3 ] That is what is so peculiar about the polemic surrounding the "Matin" interview: One says that what this interview contains is mistaken; and one then states what one oneself has to say: and in everything factual one only gives confirmations of what is in the interview.

[ 4 ] Major Muff believes that the "Matin" article will cause the "normal thinker" to "blame" Germany after all, because it is said that the German mobilization plan provided for war not only against Russia but also against France, and that this plan had to be carried out with an "inexorable automatism". To support this belief, Major Muff quotes a sentence from the interview, to which he adds an interjection of his own: "So it came about that the decision on the outbreak of war had to be made out of purely military considerations - meaning the inflexible deployment plan of the German General Staff." This quote becomes incorrect when Major Muff adds the words: "what is meant is the inflexible deployment plan of the German General Staff". These words are not in the interview. What is meant is stated in the words that precede them in the interview. And these are: "With the mobilization order in his hand, which Wilhelm II has just signed, he (Moltke) is dismissed, leaving the others in a state of complete confusion." After pointing out that the leading political figures were in "complete confusion", Major Muff says the following: "So it came about that the decision on the outbreak of war had to be made for purely military reasons." Major Muff now construes a decision which, according to Moltke's clear statements, according to his records (and also according to Haeftens' statements in the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung"), cannot be understood as anything other than military, into a political one brought about by Molike. He says that Moltke had the firm conviction "that Russia would attack and that France and England would side with him. For him, this meant a war on two fronts, not for military but for political reasons". Moltke told the Kaiser, when he expressed his will to march east with the entire army for political reasons, that the deployment of an army of millions could not be improvised, that it was the result of long, arduous work, and that once it had been decided, it could not be changed. If the emperor wanted to lead the entire army to the east, he would not have a ready army, but a desolate heap of disorganized armed men without provisions. What could be clearer than that military reasons are being pitted against political ones. Major Muff actually feels compelled to admit this. That is why he says Moltke's reasons were political; but he gave military ones. And he constructs his train of thought as follows: "If Moltke refused to abandon the two-front deployment, which was based on Schlieffen's operational studies, this was ... not because it would not have been technically possible to carry out a different deployment, but because he was firmly convinced that France and England would immediately side with Russia... . He, the soldier, had no political grounds against the appointed leaders of German foreign policy. He had to use every means at his disposal to prevent a decision which, as head of military operations, presented him with an insoluble and disastrous task for Germany. Naturally, he resorted to a means by which alone he could expect success. For technical reasons, he declared himself unable to carry out the deployment against Russia alone, as demanded by the Kaiser and his political advisors. However, Moltke's records clearly show that his refusal was in fact based solely on political reasons." The opposite is the case. If anything is clear from Moltke's notes, it is that for military-technical reasons - Major Muff says: "as head of military operations" - he considered the strict implementation of the two-front war to be absolutely necessary at the hour in which the relevant decisions had to be made. Given Moltke's character, I cannot imagine that he would have simply closed his mind to the reasons that were certainly expressed. If one then does not quibble over words, if one refrains from describing what is certainly characterized as military-technical as political, then one can compare Major Muff's statements with those of the interview without bias. And lo and behold: the interview states: "He (Moltke) clearly foresaw the tragic development that things had to take, that is, he believed in the participation of France and England in the world conflict." Moltke's decision is attributed exactly the same as that of Major Muff. And he too thinks nothing of the appointed political leaders. But he thus admits that the decision was in von Moltke's hands. And he had to do his military duty. - How one can then still believe that the interview leads to the assertion that the German general staff brought about the tragic situation is unfathomable. From beginning to end, the interview wants to show that the tragic situation was due to the politicians' incompetence and that the German Chief of Staff acted as he had to act according to his duty. For Dr. Sauerwein, there was no reason to "laugh up his sleeve". This could only arise if people in Germany continued to say that they were "opposed" to the "shift in the level of discussion" in the direction that one could not speak of "German guilt" in the sense in which it had previously been spoken of in the non-German world.

[ 5 ] If one wishes to stick to the straightforward, unconcealed facts as described by von Moltke, it is not a matter of discussing the doctoral question of whether the assertion that the mobilization order in Germany was equivalent to a declaration of war was nonsensical from a military point of view. We are not talking about military-technical definitions, but about the reality of late July and early August 1914. And Major Muff himself says of this reality that the military-technical "nonsense" was politically correct insofar as "in our efforts to localize the war, unlike our opponents, we had postponed every military measure until the very last minute, thereby giving them a valuable head start, so that the mobilization order and the start of the war coincided in time". One would think that for events taking place in time, this temporal coincidence would come into consideration, not the fact that the mobilization order and the beginning of the war have theoretically different definitions. Major Muff says: "According to plan, however, the deployment should follow immediately after mobilization so as not to lose any time. But according to the nature and manner of the preparations, the simple addition to the mobilization order should have been made: Aufmarsch wird zunächst nicht ausgeführt, would have sufficed to merely bring the mobilization to a conclusion." Certainly, according to everything that can be known from Moltke's statements, he would not have made this addition after issuing the mobilization order. For he was of the opinion that any delay would be detrimental. So although this assertion is theoretically correct, it is of no practical significance.

[ 6 ] Major Muff attaches great importance to the fact that there was also a plan for a sole deployment in the east. In contrast, two questions must be asked. First, why did von Moltke not reckon with this plan at the moment of the decision? Major Muff will say because he thought the politicians' opinion that the West would remain neutral was nonsense. But then he could not say to the Emperor: if you marched in the East, you would not have a powerful army, but rather a desolate pile of armed, unprovisioned people. And secondly: if he said this - and he did say it - why wasn't he told back? We also have the deployment plan for the East alone? There is no need to doubt that Major Muff rightly spoke of such a deployment plan on paper; but Moltke obviously did not consider it feasible for military reasons at the time when the decision had to be made by him.

[ 7 ] Major Muff also says: "Steiner undoubtedly wants to hold his shield over Moltke's memory. In truth, however, he places a tremendous responsibility on him when he claims that the decision on the outbreak of war was made by the Chief of Staff's rigid deployment plan." Firstly, I have not "claimed" anything at all, as far as I am concerned, but simply reproduced Moltke's own statements faithfully. Secondly, it is clear from this reproduction that, according to the wording of the interview, the final decision was made as follows: "At 11 o'clock he (Moltke) is rung... He goes immediately to the castle. Wilhelm II.... says: Everything has changed. The King of England has just declared in a new telegram that he has been misunderstood and that he does not assume any obligation on his behalf or on behalf of France. He concludes with the words: Now you can do what you like."

[ 8 ] I have already discussed the passage through Holland in No. 17 of this weekly publication. With regard to the Battle of the Marne, the sentences in the interview are based on von Moltke's statements; what Major Muff says is largely based on conclusions, which, however, do not affect the essence of the interview at all. For this lies in the emphasis on the "psychology" of the course of the war at the time of the Battle of the Marne. I have spoken of this because, as Major Muff does again, it is claimed that "the Chief of the General Staff, whose leadership lacked a sure hand, was more to blame than the leader of the 1st Army". Moltke's statement is a psychological counter to this assertion. - If one were to confront the "Matin" interview impartially, one would see what could be gained from Moltke's statements to exonerate Germany. In France, they are not "laughing up their sleeves" about it, but are trying to discuss it as little as possible for the time being. Because the right discussion leads to things that people don't want to hear yet. In Germany, this discussion should be conducted differently than it is. There will be more to say about this in this weekly publication.

Translated by Steiner Online Library

Translated by Steiner Online Library

Translated by Steiner Online Library

Translated by Steiner Online Library

Lecture notes by Marie Steiner

There is [an] inner relationship between Theosophy and what Freemasonry contains. There is [a] great fear of [the] Freemasons. - In Vienna, where [a] university professor and other people were present, a gentleman in my presence, a high-ranking Catholic cleric, told the following: In Rome, a dozen Dominicans [gap in transcription] had said that it was true [gap in transcription] another Catholic clergyman said that one should not go out on the streets in the dark because the Freemasons were about.

Lessing was asked if he had discovered anything dangerous to the state or anything else dangerous. No, but [gap in transcription] glad if anything [gap in transcription].

Goethe drew [the] strength for the deepest things from freemasonry [gap in transcript].

Freemasonry is said to be older than humanity because it comes from the light and earth is older than [gap in transcript].

Freemasonry is derived from Adam, because [the] apron is derived from the fig leaf.

Symbols from workshop.

Freemasonry represents a community of people who have the goal of developing.

A Mason is above all committed to improving himself to the point where he is a worthy co-worker in the construction of humanity.

The meaning of life on earth is that we remodel and rework our planet. - More and more, human labor is intervening in our earth.

What will the earth be one day? A building that man completes. And it is the duty of every human being to participate in this building.

Three forces must be built into the construction of the temple, otherwise chaos will result. The three columns on which this temple rests are wisdom, beauty and strength.

Wisdom, when he ennobles his mind.

Beauty, when he ennobles his soul.

Strength, when he ennobles his will.

Therefore, these three columns are considered the foundation of all work.

Building is done on the outside and on the inside - and best of all when these three are built in.

Free masonry is everything that happens with the help of wisdom, beauty and strength.

The correct construction of the earthly temple is meant, not just the inner being of man.

One must understand how the creation of works of art is related to masonry. Imagine the beautiful connection between the building and the soul in a Gothic cathedral in a medieval city.

A true building was one that reflects the fact that wisdom, beauty and strength live in the soul.

The pointed arches are nothing other than the folded hands of the mystic.

The deep ancient intentions come from the place where all human knowledge comes from: from the mysteries.

The principle of learning there was transformation of man.

The goal of these ancient mysteries was the birth of the spiritual man in man.

There are two ways of approaching the truths: through revelation and through bright, clear realization.

Today, theology is the most materialistic. Until the sixteenth century, it was taught that the six days were an astral dream experience of Adam.

The Temple of Solomon is considered the symbol of the great earthly temple.

In Solomon was depicted the priest-king who had come to wisdom through revelation.

In Hiram Abiff [was depicted] the man who had come to wisdom through himself.

The symbols of mathematics and mechanics are taken from dead nature, because man can tame it. He cannot yet tame the living; he can neither produce a plant, nor an animal, nor his own kind from his own power. For this he still needs the revelation of the living forces.

Only the higher nature of man can contribute to progress, the lower must recede.

“We must have places where all the lower nature is silent and only the higher nature speaks.”

The moment the Mason puts on the apron, the lower nature is no longer there – the mason commits himself to this. The entire symbolism of Freemasonry is an allegorical representation of the path that the higher man has to follow, a reflection of inner development.

To be an apprentice means to make up for what our brothers have achieved in the past.

To be a fellow journeyman means to be allowed to live with the old brothers of humanity.

Only a Master is to be allowed to work on the construction of the temple.

Such a ceremony is a reflection of the secrets of the higher worlds themselves.

Theosophy is the inner truth of these ceremonies; it says what these ceremonies show. It has the spirit of these signs and images.

[Possibly a question and answer session from here on out]

The three journeymen: the illusion of personal self, doubt, and superstition.

Man must pass through the various stages of superstition in order to arrive at knowledge. 1906

He must go through the illusion of personal self to achieve selflessness.

Those who delve into every year that Christ Jesus lived have the 33 degrees of Freemasonry.

One needs knowledge to feel compassion – walking in the light.

Only comfort of a higher kind is [it] to shy away from knowledge.

Because the Freemason wanted to see women confined to the family, he excluded them from the lodge.

Something happened on higher planes that made it a necessity for women to be drawn into all ritual work.

The male organism is bound by the forces of life. The forces of vril, the living ones, which will be conquered by women.

Theosophy represents more the studying, ideal side, freemasonry the practical side.

The occult cooperation of man and woman is the future significance of freemasonry. The excesses of the male culture must be held back by the occult powers of women.

Initiation in ancient times and now:

The etheric body was taken out of the body while in a deep trance, like: think of a hand falling asleep; the ether part then visibly hangs out of it. Thus the whole etheric body emerged in the ancient adept, and the impressions of the higher worlds were imprinted in it (as with a seal and stamp).

Now the astral body is worked on so intensely that it transmits the impressions further to the etheric body, and from there to the physical body.

Christian initiation:

1) Washing of the feet: bowing down before everyone through whose humiliation we have risen higher.
2) Flagellation
3) Crown of thorns: accepting every slander, every scorn and mockery with absolute equanimity.